Supreme Windows Defender using some articles and ma dick brain good cunt

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he posted his shit link so when I read his write up it seemed bypassable to me (if you’re reading this it4mn fuck ur papa anus but good job lad u admire ma cum).
Let’s get into the bug, on a default configuration there’s a file in 

Code:

c:\windows\temp\mpcmdrun.log

 this file is used for event logging that happen in 

Code:

mpcmdrun.log

 process, which runs in the context of the local system (highest privileges that exist on windows), as 

Code:

it4mn

 said when the log file should reach 16,777,216 bytes (16MB) in order to trigger the bug let’s thing on process monitor, you can download it here dogs
 okay lets try to fuck the bug up and see what shit we can get from it :

Let’s see what happens on procmon

As you can see the patch seems to be working as it supposed to be, you can see the 

Code:

MpCmdRun.exe

 handling the junction with 

Code:

GENERIC_ALL

 access and then he execute the control code 

Code:

FSCTL_GET_REPARSE_POINT

 and 

Code:

FSCTL_DELETE_REPARSE_POINT

 both result in success, the get reparse point control is simply check if the directory is a reparse point but the control code delete reparse point will attempt to convert the junction 

Code:

mpcmdrun.log.bak

 to a directory then it proceeds to delete it. Seems to be patched correctly! but there’s still something wrong with the patch, what if we created a junction inside the mpcmdrun.log.bak ? ex:

Code:

mpcmdrun.log.bak\test

, let’s check it out:

It worked we now have an arbitrary file deletion issue in windows defender.
Okay let’s do some more damage like hella shit cum, let’s go for a system shell oof i like shell part 
NOTE: this method will work on windows 10 only don't try on ur homo win7 and moan like peter cunt parter
Let’s see what privileges are given to :

Code:

MpCmdRun.exe

 we can inspect them in process explorer

It seems look like 

Code:

mpcmdrun

 is child process from 

Code:

MsMpEng.exe

 which is actually the AV
Let’s check the AV:

It ran in the context of 

Code:

NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM

 but what about other privileges in the token ?


The 

Code:

SeRestorePrivilege

 seems to be enabled this happen because of the inherit token of 

Code:

MsMpEng.exe

This seems to be destructive, this privilege will allow its owner to delete any file even if it isn’t allowed to do so the ACL.

In this case we will have the ability to hijack a service which we will target the Windows Media Player Network Service which is by default located on 

Code:

C:\Program Files\Windows Media Player\wmpnetwk.exe

, this file is protected by 

Code:

NT SERVICE\TRUSTEDINSTALLER

 this mitigation protected such folders from being deleted from a privileged process (such as 

Code:

administrators

 or 

Code:

SYSTEM

) and then here’s the roll of having the 

Code:

SeRestorePrivilege

 Enabled this will allow us to bypass this mitigation so we can clean the entire directory 

Code:

C:\Program Files\Windows Media Player

, However the Windows Media Player Network Service is on demand service start in windows 10 and it’s ACL allow INTERACTIVE group to start it we can inspect such services detail in process hacker


Those are some good info so if we have the ability to recreate 

Code:

C:\Program Files\Windows Media Player

 directory we can hijack the service with a malicious one, luckily and a big thanks to jonasLyk for providing a technique to allow arbitrary directory creation from an arbitrary file deletion you can see the article here 13 
The technique is simple if we deleted the entire 

Code:

C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\WER

 directory, the windows error reporting tool will recreate it for us and then create 

Code:

C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\WER\Temp

 allowing authenticated Users to have write&delete access on both WER and Temp directories

which will allow user to abuse the Temp folder creation by creating a reparse point from 

Code:

C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\WER

 to 

Code:

\RPC CONTROL\

 and then creating a symlink from 

Code:

\RPC CONTROL\Temp

 -> 

Code:

C:\Program Files\Windows Media Player

 so as soon we rerun the scheduled task 

Code:

\Microsoft\Windows\Windows Error Reporting\QueueReporting

 the 

Code:

C:\Program Files\Windows Media Player

 folder will be created with new rights allowing authenticated user to write on it so we can write a payload and then start the service the only problem we will have is the gained privileges

As you can see here we aren’t running as 

Code:

NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM

 instead the service is ran as 

Code:

NT AUTHORITY\Network Service

 this service account doesn’t have full control over the system which is an issue we can easily address, Thanks again to it4mn for his awesome shit cunt security patch and bypassable papa but he is a good gay at least not super lq good shit 
itm4n.github.io he has some super cool stuff like github.com/klinix5/WinDefend_ZeroDay and https://itm4n.github.io/printspoofer-abu...rivileges/
 

• exploiting the issue will take up to 35min according to clement we need to fill 
  Code:

  mpcmdrun.log
   with 16.5mb data in order to trigger the issue.
  
  don't forget 16.5mb dummies and ty for hella time that u gave me to rape ur brain with ma dog style words and gtfoh 
  

https://cracked.to/Thread-Supreme-Commun...M-DARKSHIT

 
 

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ma dick brain good cunt

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